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The relationship between science and religion is a highly complex and 
controversial one. Some argue that it is best characterised as warfare; that 
the two fields are fundamentally incompatible,! whereas others have 
attempted to study the 'fruitful interactions'2 or similarities of intention 
between them.J Some argue that the two fields are different ways of 
arriving at the same end, or the same reality.4 Others argue that science and 
religion should be kept apart; that neither can have any substantial effect on 
the other.5 There are other approaches: some argue that terms such as 
'warfare' or compatibility are inappropriate6 or too constraining.? 
This paper will explore three areas: first, the division between science 
and religion, or between scientia and logos, needs to be examined; second, 
the relationship between them will be discussed in the context of 
deconstruction; thirdly, the impact of the relationship upon modern 
Australian literature has been largely, and surprisingly, neglected - certainly 
the available literature on the fiction of White, Malouf and Carey suggests 
that there is much work to be done in this and related areas. 
The distinctions between science and religion have not always been 
affirmed. The ancient Greeks used the term logos to signify a principle of 
order or of rational structure in the cosmos.B This principle was not always 
synonymous with God or the Greek gods. In Stoic literature, the logos is 
Reason, an impersonal but universal source of the rhythms of life and 
death.9 In Heraclitean texts, the logos is a foundational law which regulates 
the dynamics of opposition and harmony in all natural processes.IO It 
signifies ratio, measure and immortal being. II (Indeed, Heidegger reads this 
logos as the Being of beings - a lightning flash that disappeared because no 
one held on to 'the streak of light'.)l2 In Neoplatonic writings the logos is 
Mind or Intellectual Principle, which is to say, the principle of unity and 
being.13 In other words, it is a higher intelligence which is also -crucially-
intelligible in the world of perceivable things. The Neoplatonic mind 
thought of it as the archetype of the human mind and as the force which 
emanates throughout nature and makes all natural things copies of divine 
forms and ideas.l4 Of course, in the gospel of John the logos becomes the 
word of God which is incarnate in the son in the form of wisdom and 
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redemptive capability, whereas in the work of Philo, nous (mind) and logos 
(cause) are unified.l5 The word comes to signify the Scriptures themselves 
just as it comes to signify the sacred nature of language (legein, the verb 
form, means literally 'say' or 'tell'). The logos spermatikos16 signifies a 
creative, intelligent and intelligible source, a type of 'seminal reason'; a 
higher intellect 17 of which scientia (knowledge) can be gained. 
Yet it is by no means rare to find scientia (now largely associated with 
the sciences) and logos (now largely associated with Christianity and God) 
mentioned as opposites. The relationship is characterised at times in terms 
of conflict or unending tension. Theologians have had to defend religion 
against science (one might think of the cases of Galileo or Darwin); scientists 
have been persecuted by religious institutions; scientific theories have not 
been taken up readily because of resistance from churches. Such sources of 
conflict have magnified what seems to be a fundamental division. Certainly 
it is difficult to see how science and religion can be reconciled, in one sense, 
especia lly since there are fundan1entally different contexts, methods, a ims 
and age ndas at work in each d iscipline . There are also very different ideas 
and presuppositions about the nature of the world, its origins and its ends 
(for example, empirica ll y-based theories of the ' Big Bang' and 'Big Crunch' 
and theological beliefs concerning apocalyptic ends - in which a divine 
scheme is completed. Or one might think of the emphasis on arbitrariness, 
contingency and chance on the one hand and the insistence upon design, 
the workings of Grace or predestination on the other.) 
Yet debates about the opposition or the tensions between science and 
religion have been transformed by recent debates about deconstruction. 
Broadly speaking, three points should be made in this context about the 
impact of deconstruction. First, deconstructive readings have provided 
critiques of the structure of conceptual and other oppositions . IS These 
critiques have important implications in terms of the view that science and 
religion are irrevocably opposed. These critiques have also questioned the 
view that one of these opposites ought to be privileged above the other in 
terms of access to truth or certainty. Deconstruction is, in one sense, an 
attempt to destabilise this opposition from within; to overturn the attempt 
to assert that one part of the opposition has a higher or superior value than 
the other in these terms.l9 
The aim is to show that the structure of such oppositions is 
intrinsically unstable . One might say that deconstruction reveals the 
internal fault-lines so to speak which are at the bases of such systems of 
opposition as well as at the bases of dialectical structures of interpretation. 
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Once these faultlines are revealed the conceptual structure is shown to be 
questionable or self-defeating.20 As an example one might think of recent 
attempts to show that myth is not in fact peculiar to a religious 
understanding of the world but that it also figures in explanations which are 
privileged as 'scientific'.21 The aim here is clear in one sense: to show that a 
conceptual opposition - one discipline is contaminated by myth; one is 
supposedly not contaminated by myth - is untenable. The question of just 
what gives rise to these oppositions and whether this dialectical structure 
(thesis/antithesis or binary antinomies) is justifiable becomes crucial. 
Secondly, deconstruction leads to a radical revision of the relationship 
between science and religion. Some critics have argued that a dismantling of 
the rhetorical structures by which the sciences are exalted is required. It is 
required because technologies of devastation have been produced; because 
environmental catastrophes have occurred, ostensibly as a result of the 
view that nature is something to be tamed and mastered; and because, it is 
argued, science has led people further and further away from the 'ground of 
Being' .22 The aim is to reaffirm the central and foundational ontological 
importance of this 'ground'. According to this view, the great conceptual 
oppositions of western metaphysics - not just the opposition between 
science and religion - need to be de-structured or dismantled from within. 
The aim is to clear away the conceptual obstacles which litter the path to the 
'house of Being'. (There are problems - a point that is not new - with this 
sort of approach but a discussion of these is outside the scope of this paper.) 
Accordingly, the third point that should be made about deconstrucive 
strategies is that they seem to affirm something mysterious at work in the 
world which de-structures conceptual polarities.23 This something unravels 
the structured oppositions which supposedly characterise metaphysics, 
theology and religion.24 These oppositions, it is claimed, have their sources 
in humanism as well as in dualistic traditions such as Neoplatonism, 
Gnosticism and Hegelian idealism, with its emphasis on the generation of 
oppositions and the resolution of these .25 (Two questions arise here: the 
question of epistemological reductionism and of essentialism, particularly 
in terms of the rather simplified understanding, for example, of 
metaphysics and humanism, which are after all extremely complex and 
multi-layered discourses.) 
Numerous aspects of the relationship between religion and science are 
apparent in the novels of White, Malouf and Carey. For example, Carey's 
Tristan Smith inhabits a world (Voorstand) where the mythological and 
sacred dimensions of religious experience have been supplanted by 
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technologies which produce Simulacra, that is, machines. Consequently, the 
religious dimension has been lost and Tristan sees the mechanical images 
take the places of the mythological beings. In this way, the narrator suggests 
that the world has become demythologised or desacralised: science and 
technology have superseded religion and myth; surfaces without depth 
have superseded, in true postmodernist fashion, the resonances and 
profundities of mythological signs and figures . 
The satire in the novel is sharpened considerably: it suggests that this 
world is more concerned with surfaces and appearances. There is little 
attempt to look behind the facades; indeed, the novel suggests that the 
facades conceal a hollowness or an emptiness. Holograms, which are in a 
sense pure surfaces, proliferate. It is no wonder that Tristan, whose physical 
appearance is regarded as monstrous, should be treated with such suspicion 
and distaste. It is thought-provoking to say the least that Tristan wears a 
mask which makes him appear to be a demythologised figure, a type of 
simulacrum himself (a mouse). In this context and in this world, adverse 
judgments are based on the perception of appearances and an inability or 
unwillingness to distinguish between appearance and reality. Sadly, the 
appearance defines the reality. 
In one sense, Patrick White was interested, surprisingly, in some of the 
parallels and analogies. This is surprising because he was, like the 
deconstructionists, otherwise suspicious of the claim that language could be 
used without ambiguity, mystery or slippage;26 or in other words, that 
language in the sciences could be produced in forms which are 
uncontaminated by mythological traces or metaphorical structures. 
Patrick White's novels are explicitly concerned with religion and 
science at many levels. He claimed that much of his work entailed an 
attempt to find symbols which are worthy of worship. Indeed, his work is 
full of such symbols: one need only think of the chariot and the four riders, 
the mandala, the chapel, the wilderness in which all that is inessential is 
cast off, and the vivisector. It is interesting to note too, though the issue has 
not been studied in any detail, that White made use of the figure of the 
scientist in a number of novels. Yet his approach is not deconstructive. 
Characters such as Palfreyman in Voss, who combine scientific training and 
a religious outlook, are relatively ignored or overlooked.27 A brief 
discussion of the figure of the vivisector should suffice to make the point 
that White was interested in the relation. 
Vivisection clearly connotes a scientific procedure. In the novel of that 
name, White uses the figure of the vivisector and the image of vivisection 
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in at least four ways. The vivisector, in one sense, is one who adopts the 
reductionist method: that is, he believes that in order to understand a 
complex living whole, it is sufficient to isolate and study each of its parts. 
The sum total of the knowledge of these parts will yield a comprehensive 
understanding of the entire form of life. Knowledge of the interior life of an 
entity then is gained through an invasive and analytical procedure which 
explores the relationship between the constituent elements. Yet White's 
novel suggests that there is an element of insensitivity, even of cruelty, in 
this type of procedure. 
Certainly, vivisection emerges as something shocking and repellent in 
the novel: 
There was a little brown stuffed dog clamped to a kind of operating table. 
The dog's exposed teeth were gnashing in a permanent and most realistic agony. 
It's guts, exposed too, and varnished pink to grey-green, were more realistic still (135) 
In passages such as these the reader feels the horror which the artist 
glimpses in the window. The image in the window evokes fear and anxiety 
in the onlooker in the novel. It is also associated with agony and death. 
Significantly, there is no mention of the knowledge that is produced by such 
procedures nor is there any mention of the beneficial uses to which this 
knowledge may be put. It would seem then that the narrator equates such 
procedures with cruelty and destructiveness.28 
But White makes matters more complicated than this. The novel 
audaciously suggests that there is a parallel between the dog in the window 
and the subjects whom the artist studies, draws and paints. The artist and 
the vivisector, the novel suggests, have a number of things in common: 
both employ the strategy of dismantling; both take apart, in a sense, destroy 
in order to discover or to reveal; both torture, at least from the narrator's 
point of view. What is implied here is that the scientist and the artist are 
not opposite or dissimilar figures in every sense - quite the contrary. This is 
a bold suggestion, especially given the fact that much of the literature on 
science and religion stresses not the similarities but the differences or the 
conflicts between the two. 
Furthermore, the image of the vivisector is not confined to the artist 
and the scientist but also to God in the novel. God is named as a vivisector 
by the artist who inscribes this on a wall. The connection is forged between 
artist, God and scientist. Each, the novel suggests, takes apart in order to 
create or to reconstruct; each destroys in order to create or each creates in 
order to destroy. The artist is understood in the novel as one who has a 
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complex personality with numerous, seemingly discordant facets. These 
facets include a troubling duality: the artist, according to White is a destroyer 
as well as a creator. Or in other words, according to this novel, the artist 
cannot be one without also being the other. This is why White's novel and 
many others like it are ambivalent towards the figure of the artist and 
towards the act of creation itself. There is a highly ambiguous attitude 
towards figures such as Hurtle and it is thought provoking to say the least 
that White saw himself in a number of senses in Hurtle Duffield.29 The 
strategy is not so much 'anti-humanist';30 it demythologises. 
So White's novel seems to affirm the figure of the artist even as it 
raises troubling ethical questions about the treatment that is meted out to 
the artist's subjects - one might add, by implication, about the treatment that 
White the writer meted out to some of his friends and associates. In this 
sense, the figure of the artist and the motif of the creative imagination are 
demythologised. It is too simplistic to claim as some critics have claimed 
that White's intention was to celebrate the artistic imagination or to exalt 
the figure of the artist. There are too many deeply disquieting aspects of 
White's meditations on the artist in such novels. There are many 
ambiguities and the artist often emerges as a morally compromised figure in 
such works. If this is accurate, then it would seem that White was interested 
in an ironic treatment of such figures not in an uncritical celebration of 
them; not in a 'refusal to demythologise',31 but in a dismantling. The 
religious intention in White's novels mentioned earlier would seem to be 
at odds with the articulated images and metaphors which convey cruelty as 
well as creativity. 
The question of whether White's audacious metaphors are more 
rhetorical than accurate is an important one. But it is not one that can be 
answered here. Certainly it is important to examine the connections that 
White's novel makes and to ask if the similarities between vivisector and 
artist are as strong and as clear as the novel suggests. The metaphor of the 
vivisector certainly has a rhetorical force in the novel and it certainly 
succeeds to a degree in its persuasive intent. But one wonders if artists and 
vivisectors are really so alike. One wonders too whether the differences 
ought to be suppressed or ignored. Perhaps a deconstrucive approach to the 
metaphors articulated within the novel would help. 
Malouf's Remembering Babylon is concerned with the use of pseudo-
scientific jargon and with the appropriation of taxonomy, classification and 
observation. First, it is significant that one of the earliest 'theories' in the 
novel is that Gemmy had started as a white person and had become black. 
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According to this theory, the 'whole cast of his face' (p. 40) had changed 
because he had lived among the aboriginals. Facial structure and its 
transformations over time are explained in terms which many of the 
listeners seem to accept as true. They seem to accept the explanation because 
it seems to be based on observation and inference. In other words, Malouf 
suggests rather satirically that the conditions which generally provide the 
bases of scientific theories are parodied so successfully that the listeners 
actually believe that the explanation must have the force of a scientific one. 
Yet the use of irony and satire suggests that the narrator sees these people as 
ignorant and bigoted individuals. For example, another explanation 
suggests that Gemmy's jaw has changed physically because of the fact that he 
spoke five languages. This explanation is taken seriously by the listeners 
whereas the reader of the novel realises that such explanations are not based 
on any evidence whatsoever. They are based on the fear and suspicion 
which Gemmy is subjected to and they are self-serving in a crucial sense. 
The pseudo-scientist adds: 
Wasn't it true (this was not Mr Frazer but another delver into deep things) that white 
men who stayed too long In China were inclined to develop, after a time, the slanty 
eyes and nat faces of your yellow man, your Chinese? (p. 41) 
Malouf cleverly parodies not just the nonsensical theorising of such 
individuals but also their speech patterns. The effect would be very amusing 
were it not so troubling. What is particularly disquieting in the novel 
-though interestingly, commentators have not commented on it - is the 
exalted status that is so quickly given to theories which are based on 
supposition and prejudice. The problem is not so much that the evidence is 
lacking but rather that there is no interest in the actual evidence at all. So 
even as the theorist gains assent within the novel the reader sees the 
theorist as a fraud, or as a pseudo-scientist who makes use of outdated and 
discredited social Darwinist concepts about race, intelligence and 
physiognomy to reinforce deep-seated prejudices. 
One irony that the reader can delight in is the suggestion that the 
ignorant or backward one here is certainly not Gemmy. In this way, the 
reader also gains a deeper understanding of the reasons why Gemmy 
disappears from this world; why he seeks other people and other places. His 
deliverance unsurprisingly takes place in solitude and in the wilds- or in 
other words, in the place where such theorists and their attitudes are not 
found. Malouf also seems to suggest that the possibilities Gemmy offers to 
these people -spiritual and civil possibilities - cannot be realised so long as 
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the pseudo-scientific rhetoric, with its racist connotations, persists and is 
disseminated. 
Remembering Babylon, then, becomes not so much a matter of 
remembering a place where communion is possible but of remembering a 
place in which communion is denied. Or in other words, it becomes a 
matter of remembering a place where the prospect of reconciliation is made 
impossible by the gulf that separates people with many affinities - some of 
which are spiritual - largely through the misappropriation of the discourses 
of theoretical inquiry and supposedly scientific methodologies. Crucially, 
Gemmy seems to offer the ch<mce to dismantle the false oppositions which 
are constructed by the 'theorists' discussed. In this sense, the failure that the 
novel marks might be called the failure or absence of deconstruction. The 
oppositions remain intact; these binary structures are employed in order to 
ground discourses of exclusion and marginalisation; they are perceived to be 
stable and sound s tructures (crucially, the novel unravels them even as the 
characters try to erect them); and, as a consequence, Gemmy, along with the 
creative, spiritual and unifying possibilities that he offers, disappears. 
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